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STATE FOR EAP/CM AND NEA/NGA

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [IZ](#) [MG](#)
SUBJECT: MONGOLIAN VIEWS REGARDING IRAQ DEPLOYMENTS

REF: A. A) STATE 04865
[1](#)B. B) 07 ULAANBAATAR 0681

Classified By: Ambassador Mark C. Minton for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)

[1](#)1. (S) SUMMARY: Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA) Tsogtbaatar told the DCM January 23 that President Enkhbayar,

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his boss, firmly supports Mongolia's continued presence, stressing Mongolia is essentially in Iraq to support the U.S. In general, Mongolians support such a presence, in Tsogtbaatar's view, but the Government of Mongolia (GOM)

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prefers the cover of a UNSC resolution. Tsogtbaatar was unsure whether June Parliamentary elections would change this dynamic (ditto regarding U.S. elections), adding it was unlikely the Parliament would consider changing existing legal restrictions during an election year. He sought additional background information on the Defense Cooperation Agreement idea, welcomed this initial dialogue, and offered suggestions for other consultations, END SUMMARY.

[1](#)2. (S) The DCM met January 23 with Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA) Tsogtbaatar to discuss ref A proposal regarding post-2009 participation in coalition activities in Iraq. Tsogtbaatar said he knew President Enkhbayar's view, which was to support the U.S. in Iraq, but he could not speak for the Prime Minister or the Speaker, the other two members of Mongolia's National Security Council, nor the Cabinet. He noted that this was an election year for both the U.S. and Mongolia (for Parliament and local government this year) so it was difficult to predict how the winners might respond as far out as 2009 and beyond, and Mongolia will hold presidential elections in 2009, though he predicted President Enkhbayar would win that race. In general, he felt that both Mongolia's ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party as well as the Democratic Party supported Mongolia's continued presence in Iraq and that support among the Mongolian public for a presence was generally strong. That said, Mongolia's presence would also need to be considered within the context of the participation of other coalition partners, he added.

[1](#)3. (S) Turning to the framework under which Mongolia participated, Tsogtbaatar underscored the importance of a UN Security Council Resolution to provide the umbrella for Mongolia's participation. He urged that some sort of "bare

bones" UNSC resolution be worked out and he mused that Mongolia might co-sponsor such a resolution. He thought participation under a U.S.-Iraq Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) would be problematic, reiterating ref B constraints on Mongolia's forces (can't be used for combat outside Mongolia's borders, limited participating under UNSC resolutions, etc.), but he did not/not rule out such participation. He said he was not familiar with U.S. DCAs nor Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) and he asked for some background reading material on these topics.

¶4. (S) Tsogtbaatar was circumspect about prospects of getting any kind of special legislation passed through Parliament to circumvent existing restrictions, noting Parliament and the GOM has a full plate already this election year. He concluded by reiterating that it was his view that this current government, which will last at least through the June elections, would remain in Iraq through 2008 because it supports the U.S. This initial exchange on post-2009 was useful, in his view, and he suggested making discreet approaches as well to the Prime Minister's Foreign Policy Advisor, Mr. Jambaldorj (previously the Director General of the Foreign Ministry's Americas, Middle East, and Africa bureau) and the Foreign Ministry.

¶5. (S) The DATT's gleanings from his discussions with Ministry of Defense officials revealed a somewhat more tentative assessment of Mongolia's staying power in Iraq, suggesting that Mongolia might rethink its current 100 troop commitment should the Poles pull out, regardless of whether another coalition force might replace the Poles. However, MOD does not/not play a role in the political decision-making process.

¶6. (S) COMMENT: Post's view is that the Mongolian population largely supports a presence in Iraq and understands, in general, that it is dangerous business, although this support has not been tested to date by casualties. In general, most Mongolian politicians either do not recognize this popular support or see it as more tenuous. Tsogtbaatar's boss, President Enkhbayar, has been constant in his support for the U.S. (as Tsogt repeatedly underscored, vice commitment to Iraqi freedom, stability, etc.). Clearly a UNSC resolution affords the GOM the greatest political cover, both domestically and with neighboring Russia and China. Post concurs with Tsogt's assessment that seeking domestic legislation this year to bypass existing limitations is problematic both practically and politically and is dependent on the outcome of June's Parliamentary elections. Post will follow up with approaches to PM FPA Jambaldorj and MFA and report the results of those discussions. Post would appreciate receiving releasable DCA and SOFA background briefing materials. END COMMENT.
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